How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and democracy has focused primarily on the latter. Furthermore, these studies claim that membership in these formal international institutions (a.k.a. international organizations) increases the likelihood of the democratic survival of a newly democratic regime. Membership in these organizations provides a seal of approval that the newly democratic country intends to remain democratic. This kind of external validation should dissuade spoilers from undermining the transition and encourage ordinary people to support the transitional regime. This argument assumes that the domestic audience trusts this organization and believes it plays a vital role in society. Whether elites have confidence that the regional organization can positively impact democratic consolidation and how they perceive different types of regional organizations promoting democracy are empirical questions. This project seeks to answer these questions through a small sample and non-population-based elite survey experiment in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I also run a laboratory survey experiment with a larger sample of university students, giving me the opportunity for statistical power. The results suggest that political elites are skeptical of regional intergovernmental bodies promoting democracy. Meanwhile, non-elites consider regional institutions promoting democracy illegitimate when they are informal, i.e., no written shared expectations, rules, and permanent secretariat. When regional interstate cooperation on democracy operates under a formal procedure or codified in an international treaty and supported by a permanent secretariat, non-elites tend to consider them more legitimate.

Regarding the question “Why do sanctions fail?” the majority of sanctions studies take the perspective of the target countries or the interactions between the dyadic countries involved, but the sender countries’ impact on sanctions’ effectiveness is largely neglected. This dissertation looks at the domestic economic actors, i.e., enterprises and consumers, of the sender countries. By answering “Who participates in economic sanctions?” this dissertation assesses one factor potentially influencing the sanctions’ effectiveness: the sanctions participation and evasion inside the sender countries. More precisely speaking, this dissertation applies the factor of the political connections economic actors have with their governments to explain their participation in or circumvention from sanctions imposed by their own countries. This dissertation consists of three independent empirical papers, respectively. The first looks at the anti-Japanese consumer boycotts in China 2012, the second at the trade controls by companies inside mainland China targeting Taiwan in 2002, and the third, the Steel and Aluminum Tariffs imposed by the US since 2018. Generally speaking, the papers find that strong political connections in China promote sanctions participation, reflected via the larger transaction reduction by organizational consumers and State-Owned Enterprises, yet facilitate sanctions evasion in the US, reflected by the larger chance for tariff exemptions for companies with more political importance and monetary investment to the governments. Dissertation findings reveal the effect of connections on sanctions, and at the same time show how divergent institutions make one variable function in the opposite way.

This dissertation proposes a theory of authoritarian control of the armed forces using the economic theory of the firm. To establish a “master-servant” relationship, an organization structures governance as a long-term contractual agreement to mitigate the vulnerabilities associated with uncertainty and bilateral dependency. The bargaining power for civilian and military actors entering a contractual relationship is assessed by two dimensions: the negotiated political property rights and the credible guarantee of those rights. These dimensions outline four civil-military institutional arrangements or army types (cartel, cadre, entrepreneur, and patron armies) in an authoritarian system. In the cycle of repression, the more the dictator relies on the military for repression to stay in office, the more negotiated political property rights obtained by the military; and the more rights obtained by the military the less civilian control. Thus, the dependence on coercive violence entails a paradox for the dictator—the agents empowered to manage violence are also empowered to act against the regime. To minimize this threat, the dictator may choose to default on the political bargain through coup-proofing strategies at the cost to the regime’s credibility and reputation, later impacting a military’s decision to defend, defect, or coup during times of crisis. The cycle of repression captures the various stages in the life-cycle of the political contract between the regime and the armed forces providing insights into institutional changes governing the relationship. As such, this project furthers our understanding of the complexities of authoritarian civil–military relations and contributes conceptual tools for future studies.

This study examines the factors that shape the timing of a passage of a piece of controversial gender equality legislation by conducting a case study of the abolition of the family-head system in South Korea. This study draws on the method of process tracing with the data collected from the archives and the interviews. The case study mainly compares the legislative processes for the bills on the abolition of the family-head system in 16th and the 17th National Assemblies, in which the bills resulted to opposite outcomes.

This study argues that the institutions of the legislative process mediate the impact of relevant actors for gender equality policymaking. In the bill initiation stage, only a small number of the elected officials are required to introduce a bill, and women representatives serve a vital role as they are more likely to introduce feminist bills than their male colleagues. This study argues that 1) the background of the women influencing their commitment to feminist agendas, 2) strong women’s movements contributing to issue saliency, and thereby the policy priorities of the issue, and 3) the resources and constraints inside the party for feminist policymaking influenced by party ideology, shape how active women representatives will be in advocating controversial gender equality agendas.

In the later stages of policymaking, the efforts of a small number of women members are offset by that of political parties. Emphasizing the positive agenda control of the majority party and the negative agenda control of the minority parties, this study suggests that party issue positions are critical for the outcome of the bill. To explain the party issue position (re)shape, this study underlines 1) public opinion, 2) the emergence of new voter groups leading to the decline of the cleavage politics, 3) new party entry, and 4) women in the party and the party leadership. The findings highlight that the major parties’ issue positions shift in the 17th National Assembly greatly contributed to amplifying the bargaining power of the key allies and weakening the institutional leverage of the opponents, leading to the successful legislation of the bill.

The overall purpose of this project was to examine a democratic transition and the factors that lead to a transition by looking at a specific country case. The Malaysian 2018 General Election saw the Barisan Nasional (BN) political party, which had been in power since the nation’s independence, lose to the opposition party, Pakatan Harapan (PH), in a shocking turn of events. When looking at this particular case, it was important to first establish what the most common factors are, that exist in democratic transitions. By applying these factors to the Malaysian case, it allowed for a deeper understanding of whether or not this democratic transition would take root quickly or instead take several years. Along with connecting these academically studied factors to Malaysia, it was also critical at examining the major events unique to the country that helped contribute to the BN’s loss. When examining this case in particular, what became evident was that the election results and overall transition had already been building up for several years.

The implementation of gender quotas in the Costa Rican legislature presents an interesting case study that with the use of national legislative gender quotas, women’s issues are more positively addressed within the country. This analysis argues that with the higher presence of women legislators in the Legislative Assembly made possible by the quota these women. in turn, have created more gender-focused policies. Thusly, higher amounts of female-focused policy will positively impact women’s issue areas within Costa Rican society. This argument will be supported by other scholar’s research on the subject of the gender quota and female equality in Costa Rica. I will also be presenting my own research that will investigate the data taken from the Costa Rican health ministry, UNICEF, and other organizations to comparatively evaluate the improvement of problems that women face coinciding with the higher female presence in the legislature.

This thesis comparatively examines the percentage of women who have been appointed to federal level Cabinet positions in the United States and Canada between 1980 and 2010. The thesis will first explain the differences in the nation's democratic systems -- presidential and parliamentarian -- to contextualize how each nation elects federal representatives coupled with their process of appointing individuals to Cabinet positions per administration. Then the thesis will briefly explain the basis of the political parties that have been active in each country alongside their prominent ideals, in an effort to understand the impact it has had on the number of women elected to federal positions. Finally, the research will focus on the number of women appointed to Cabinet to demonstrate how an increase in the amount of political parties, creates more competition between political parties, in turn allowing for a higher number of women to be elected as well as appointed to federal positions. In conclusion, the research suggests that liberal party's push forth more women to federal level positions in both countries. Coupled with the fact that the increase in the amount of office holding parties increases competition between parties and increases the number of women appointed to Cabinet.

One clause added to the Mexican constitution on February 10, 2014, set off a sea change in the way Mexican elections are conducted. By requiring states to hold at least one local election concurrent with federal contests, the timing of entire races changed, most notably with regard to a number of gubernatorial races, and Mexico embarked on an adventure of creating concurrence. The result is a wave of governors serving terms of two, four or five years instead of the customary six, creating so-called gubernaturas cortas (short governorships). This phenomenon has potential implications for the relationship of state and federal elections and voter turnout in state races. This work analyzes the potential impacts of concurrence by looking at four previous cases of states that have moved to concurrent elections: Yucatán, which moved its gubernatorial elections forward a year to coincide with the presidential elections beginning in 2012; Guerrero and Baja California Sur, which brought their gubernatorial elections two years forward beginning in 2015 to coincide with midterm elections for the Chamber of Deputies; and Michoacán, which pushed its elections two years back and split the elongated term in two, in order to line up with the federal calendar in 2015. It argues that concurrent elections reduce the disparity between gubernatorial and proportional representation deputy performance, particularly when the election is concurrent with the federal midterm, but that variation continues to exist due to strategic voting effects and the attractiveness of individual candidates.

Since the passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 (FECA) up until the most recent election in 2012, presidential campaign funds have risen over five hundred percent. While money has always been an essential and critical part of any political campaign, this rise has been drastic and continues to increase at a higher rate with every election cycle, even when the numbers are adjusted for inflation. The purpose of this paper is to examine this continuous increase in cost of presidential campaigns and to analyze the different pieces that have contributed to this rise. The main pieces include two Supreme Court cases: Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the rise and fall of federally regulated public funding and the various pieces of a presidential campaign that have considerably higher ticket prices with each election cycle. This paper first goes through both Buckley and Citizens, describing what each Supreme Court decision did and how they effected how much money can be spent in a presidential campaign and by whom. The paper then examines each presidential election since the passage of FECA in 1974 through the last election with President Barack Obama and Mitt Romney in 2012. Each election cycle is broken down to show how much money was spent by each candidate and the Republican and Democratic National Committees, whether or not the money was received through public funds or raised privately, and subsequently the percentages of where the money was spent. While the examination of the Court cases helps to understand why so much money can be donated and contributed directly to campaigns or spent on behalf of a presidential candidate, the breakdown of where the money is spent including advertising, travel, staff salaries etc. helps to show why a presidential campaign costs over five hundred percent more today than it did forty years ago. By understanding this increase, how it was caused and where the money is going, it is more feasible to comprehend whether or not campaign finance reform should be proposed and if so, how it should be brought about.

The 2012 South Korean presidential elections made headlines around the world with the election of the country's first woman president, Park Geun-Hye. While some media outlets glossed over the story with remarks of South Korea's "forward" and "progressive" thinking, many others were quick to point out the extremely unique case of President Park Geun-Hye's election and the continuing gender inequality that exists in South Korea. Among statistics that indicate gender inequality within a country, South Korea's percentage of women's representation in its National Assembly currently sits at 15.6%, one of the lowest among similarly developed countries. South Korea first adopted its gender quota system in 2000. But after the initial jump in women's representation from 3% in 1996 to 13% in 2004 election, there has been no significant rise in women's representation in South Korea. This paper looks into the low transition of Assemblywomen in Proportional Representation seats to Single Member Districts following their first term in the Korean National Assembly as an indicator of the inability for sustainable growth in women's representation in South Korea to occur despite their gender quota legislation. I look at committee assignments, a key reelection tool, in order to measure the electability of Assemblywomen after they are termed out of the PR seat. The results indicate that Assemblywomen are sidelined to women's issues and social issues committee. But results also indicate that it is difficult for their male PR seatmates to transition into SMD seats as well. This leads to the conclusion that it is the PR system as a whole that makes it difficult for PR Assemblymembers to create a political career by transitioning into a SMD seat.