Corruption is a growing issue in China that has only worsened in recent years due to the competition for power between the two foremost factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Tuanpai and Princelings. Based on a series of case studies of high-ranking Chinese officials, I analyze patterns of corruption employed by members of the two factions that enable them to gain power and authority within the CCP. This analysis argues that due to the high levels of intense corruption within China and the CCP, change in the form of small and gradual reform is the only way to battle this corruption without further threatening the legitimacy of the government. Small changes such as allowing the competition between factions to remain as a form of checks and balances for the government or allowing more freedom with social media will gain some trust back for the Chinese government. If drastic changes are made and all corrupt officials in the government are indicted, that may in turn destabilize the country by ruining all faith in the government and removing so many individuals who contribute to day-to-day governance. This analysis suggests that possible solutions must start small and gradually increase to maintain the stability and legitimacy of China and the CCP while also beginning to fight the corruption culture.

East Asia in the aftermath of the Cold War might provide the most favorable case for realist theory due to historical rivalries, territorial disputes, economic competition, great power politics and deep-rooted realist beliefs among politicians in the region. Yet the fundamental realist prediction of balance of power in the region has not materialized. Neither internal nor external balancing in their original senses is explicitly present. This poses a serious challenge to realism and more broadly, western international relations theories for understanding regional dynamics. Several explanations have been put forward in previous research, such as a total rejection of the applicability of realism for explaining East Asian politics, modifying realism by adding new variables, and focusing on domestic variables. Using a neoclassical realist term, underbalancing, this dissertation goes beyond neoclassical realist theory of underbalancing by reintroducing the distinction between external and internal balancing, which has direct implications for the resources needed for a balancing policy and external reactions to balancing policy. In particular, this approach emphasizes the effect of interaction between states on underbalancing. By doing so, it also highlights what is omitted by realism, namely, the agency of the targeted state at risk of being balanced. In other words, the policy of the state that is aware of its risk of being balanced could draw upon foreign policy tools it possesses to neutralize the balancing efforts from others. This notion of state policies influencing the outcome of balance of power is tested with post-Cold War East Asian politics. The cases included China-Japan and China-ASEAN strategic interactions after the Cold War. Based on materials from public media outlets, official documents and recently leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, this dissertation argues that China's policies towards neighboring states- policies expressed variously through cultural, diplomatic, economic and security initiatives- are indispensable to explain the fact of underbalancing in the region.