How do political elites perceive regional intergovernmental organizations that seek to promote democracy? When do political elites view regional intergovernmental institutions promoting democracy as legitimate? Many informal and formal types of regional intergovernmental institutions have sought to spread democracy. However, previous research on the nexus of regional intergovernmental institutions and democracy has focused primarily on the latter. Furthermore, these studies claim that membership in these formal international institutions (a.k.a. international organizations) increases the likelihood of the democratic survival of a newly democratic regime. Membership in these organizations provides a seal of approval that the newly democratic country intends to remain democratic. This kind of external validation should dissuade spoilers from undermining the transition and encourage ordinary people to support the transitional regime. This argument assumes that the domestic audience trusts this organization and believes it plays a vital role in society. Whether elites have confidence that the regional organization can positively impact democratic consolidation and how they perceive different types of regional organizations promoting democracy are empirical questions. This project seeks to answer these questions through a small sample and non-population-based elite survey experiment in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I also run a laboratory survey experiment with a larger sample of university students, giving me the opportunity for statistical power. The results suggest that political elites are skeptical of regional intergovernmental bodies promoting democracy. Meanwhile, non-elites consider regional institutions promoting democracy illegitimate when they are informal, i.e., no written shared expectations, rules, and permanent secretariat. When regional interstate cooperation on democracy operates under a formal procedure or codified in an international treaty and supported by a permanent secretariat, non-elites tend to consider them more legitimate.

Why and when do political actors use violence? This project answers these questions by exploring the dynamics of the interactions between state authorities and political dissidents. Both the state and the dissidents face the dilemma of using violence to achieve their political goals. While structural factors influence state violence and dissident violence, I contend that we need to examine how the dynamics of the state-dissident interactions shape these actors’ political behavior. This project first asks if nonviolent methods of resistance are effective--and perhaps even more successful than violent methods--why do opposition movements ever resort to violence? I argue that the efficacy of nonviolent resistance changes over time. When the likelihood of demobilization increases, dissident movements doubt the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance and weigh violence as an alternative tactic. The first chapter of this dissertation shows that the failure in expanding the size of a movement over several periods provides increases the risk of demobilization, and so dissident violence. I also argue while the expansion of the movement decreases the risk of dissident violence, a sudden and large expansion in the size of the movement overburdens its monitoring and sanctioning capacities, which raises the risk of dissident violence. These arguments are supported empirically using two different datasets. In the second theoretical part of this project, I examine the effects of foreign interventions on the dynamics of state repression and dissident violence. I find that the diplomatic statements and efforts such as disapproving state behavior, asking for political reform, and threatening to impose economic sanctions and to deploy military forces either did not have a significant effect, or increased state repression and decreased state concession during the Arab Spring. Finally, the last part of this project contributes to the literature on the formal modeling of dissent-repression by developing a recursive model of political violence dynamics. In addition to addressing several drawbacks in the literature, this model endogenizes the mobilization and demobilization of the movement and explains how these changes affect dissident violence. Due to the complexity of the developed mathematical model, I use a computational model to find the optimal outcomes. This computational model also can be used for simulating the state’s and the dissidents’ behavior under different scenarios.