Civil juries are becoming an increasingly rare means of resolving civil disputes. One reason for this is widespread mistrust in jury decision-making do to highly publicized nuclear verdicts where verdicts do not seem to match the alleged harm suffered by a plaintiff. Critics allege that jurors are biased against defendants with deep pockets. This research aims to test whether there is evidence of so-called deep-pocket bias in juror decision-making. Previous research has compared how the wealth of defendants impacts jurors’ verdicts while other studies have compared how jurors’ verdicts are impacted when the defendant is an individual versus a corporation. The first aim is to explore the impact of defendant wealth and corporate identity on jurors’ liability verdicts and damage awards. The second aim is to explore whether the theory of dyadic morality helps to explain any potential observed deep-pocket biases. The study tested the hypothesis that perceptions of a defendant’s moral agency (in other words, their responsibility and intentionality) would predict jurors’ liability verdicts while perceptions of a defendant’s moral patiency (in other words, their vulnerability and capacity for suffering) would predict jurors’ damage awards. In a study of mock juror decision-making, results concluded that when assessing the same alleged wrongdoing and harm, jurors were more confident in a liable verdict against wealthy defendants and corporate defendants compared to poor defendants and individuals as defendants. Higher perceptions of a defendant’s moral agency did explain these effects. However, there was no evidence that defendant wealth or corporate identity influenced damage awards. Ultimately, in cases where plaintiffs portray themselves as a small and vulnerable “David” taking on a large and resourceful “Goliath,” juror decision-making on liability verdicts is likely to unfairly punish “Goliath” defendants, revealing deep-pocket biases against wealthy defendants and corporations.

Risk assessments are key legal tools that can inform a number of legal decisions regarding parole sentencing and predict recidivism rates. Due to assessments being historically performed by humans, they can be prone to bias and have come under various amounts of scrutiny. The increased capability and application of machine learning technology has lead the justice system to incorporate algorithms and codes to increase accuracy and reliability. This study researched laypersons’ attitudes towards these algorithms and how they would change when exposed to an algorithm that made errors in the risk assessment process. Participants were tasked with reading two vignettes and answering a series of questions to assess the differences in their perceptions towards machine learning and clinician-based risk assessments. The research findings showed that individuals lent more trust to clinicians and had more confidence in their assessments when compared to machines, but were not significantly more punitive when it came to attributing blame and judgement for the consequences of an incorrect risk assessment. Participants had a significantly more positive attitude towards clinician-based risk assessments, noting their assessments as being more reliable, informed, and trustworthy. Participants were also asked to come to a parole decision using the assessment of either a clinician or machine learning algorithm at the end of the study and rate their own confidence in their decision. Results found that participants were only significantly less confident in their decision when exposed to previous instances of risk assessments with error, but that there was no significant difference in their confidence based solely on who conducted the assessment.

Emotions are an important part of persuasion. Experimental research suggests that White and male jurors can use emotion to increase their influence, while other jurors cannot. This research builds on prior research by examining the relationship between naturally occurring emotion during mock jury deliberations and the influence that jurors hold. Participants (N = 708) in 153 mock juries watched a murder trial video and deliberated on a verdict. Participants self-reported their experienced emotions and rated their perceptions of the other jurors’ emotion and influence. After data was collected, I extracted acoustic indicators of expressed emotion from each deliberation and used a speech emotion recognition model to classify each mock juror’s emotional expression. I hypothesized that there would be an overall effect of emotional expression on influence such that as mock jurors’ emotion increased, their influence would also increase. However, I hypothesized that a juror’s race and gender would moderate the relationship between emotion and influence such that White male jurors will be seen as more influential when they are more emotional, and that female jurors and jurors of color will be seen as less influential when they are more emotional. I also hypothesized that female jurors of color will be doubly penalized for being emotional, due to their “double-minority” status. Bayesian model averaging suggested that the data was most probable under models that included perceived emotion, race, and the interaction between the two, compared to models that did not. Consistent with the hypothesis, as participants were perceived as more emotional, their influence increased. In contrast to the hypotheses, being perceived as more emotional increased influence for both White and non-White mock jurors but the effect was stronger for non-White jurors. In other words, while all jurors benefited from being perceived as more emotional, non-White jurors benefited more than White jurors. Male jurors were more influential than female jurors, and gender did not interact with emotion.. Although being perceived as more emotional predicted increased influence for all participants, this research demonstrates that there are racial and gender disparities in the level of influence that someone might hold on a jury.

In the legal system, the prediction of a person’s risk of committing a crime has mostly been based on expert judgment. However, newer techniques that employ machine learning (ML)—a type of artificial intelligence—are being implemented throughout the justice system. Yet, there is a lack of research on how the public perceives and uses machine learning risk assessments in legal settings. In two mock-trial vignette studies, the perception of ML-based risk assessments versus more traditional methods was assessed. Study 1 was a 2 (severity of crime: low, high) x 2 (risk assessment type: expert, machine learning) x 2 (risk outcome: low, high) between-subjects design. Participants expressed ethical concerns and discouraged the use of machine learning risk assessments in sentencing decisions, but punishment recommendations were not affected. Study 2 was a within-subjects design where participants were randomly assigned read through one of three crime scenarios (violent, white-collar, sex offense) and one of three risk assessment techniques (expert, checklist, machine learning). Consistent with Study 1, participants had ethical concerns and disagreed with the use of machine learning risk assessments in bail decisions, yet their own decisions and recommendations did not reflect these concerns. Overall, laypeople express skepticism toward these new methods, but do not appear to differentially rely on ML-based versus traditional risk assessments in their own judgments.

An expanse of research has demonstrated that persons with mental illness (PWMI) tend to avoid formal psychological treatment.One possible explanation for this failure to pursue formal treatment is the tendency of religious individuals to construe mental illness as spiritual in nature, leading religious communities to actively discourage emotional and psychological help-seeking through non-spiritual means. The present study examined help-seeking behaviors among religious PWMI by examining the impact of religiosity and gender on the relationship between mental illness stigma and help-seeking behaviors. Results indicate that higher levels of perceived stigma and religious salience relate to higher reported indirect support-seeking (ISS). Moreover, only religious salience appears to significantly relate to ISS among men, whereas perceived mental illness stigma significantly predicts direct and indirect support-seeking behaviors among women.

In a trial, jurors are asked to set aside their emotions and make judgments based solely on evidence. Research suggests jurors are not always capable of this, particularly when exposed to gruesome photographic evidence. However, previous research has not looked at the potentially moderating effect of when and for how long jurors are exposed to emotionally disturbing photographs, nor how many photographs they see. In two experiments I tested the impact of the timing of and extent of exposure to gruesome photographs on jurors’ emotions, verdicts, and punishment recommendations. In Study 1, I investigated the effect of timing and exposure duration to a single gruesome photograph of a victim in a murder case (no exposure, brief early exposure, brief late exposure, and prolonged exposure) on mock jurors’ emotions and case judgments. Prolonged exposure (relative to no or brief exposure, regardless of timing) increased disgust, which in turn was associated with harsher punishment. Contrary to previous research, the photograph manipulation did not influence verdicts. The results were mixed and inconclusive regarding brief early versus late exposure. In Study 2, I compared repeatedly viewing a single gruesome photograph to viewing a set of four similar, but unique gruesome photographs—holding the exposure time constant—to assess the impact of quantity of photos on jurors’ emotions and case judgments. Viewing multiple gruesome photos (relative to no photos) led to increase in guilty verdicts through increased disgust, replicating previous research. Viewing a single gruesome photo (relative to no photo) led to increase in guilty verdicts through disgust, differing from Study 1 findings. Viewing multiple gruesome photos and a single gruesome photo led to more disgust, compared to viewing no photo. However, differing from Study 1, gruesome photographs did not lead to an increase in punishment recommendations. There were no significant differences between exposure to a single or multiple gruesome photos on disgust, verdicts, or punishments. Overall, greater exposure to gruesome evidence led to increased disgust and punitiveness, relative to those with less exposure. However, jurors with greater exposure to the same or different photographs did not differ in reported emotions, verdicts, or punitiveness.

Several states within the United States have recently passed the Victim Life Photo Act, which allows prosecutors to present photographs of alleged murder victims when they were alive during the guilt phase of a trial. Critics argue that these photographs do not offer any relevant information about the crime or the defendant’s potential guilt and might bias jurors to vote guilty based on their sympathy for the victim—perhaps disproportionally so for high-status victims. Two mock trial experiments tested whether online participants who viewed alleged murder victim photographs would convict more because they increase anger, disgust, fear, sadness, and/or sympathy. Mock jurors who saw photographs of White (but not racial minority) victims while they were alive reported more sympathy for the victim relative to those who saw the same evidence without a photograph of the living victim—but the sympathy did not increase convictions (Study 1). Study 2 extended this study by testing whether the living victim photographs are more impactful in conjunction with seeing gruesome photographs of the victim after her death, creating a particularly disturbing contrast effect versus seeing the living photograph alone. Study 2 found that (a) living victim photographs on their own again had no effect on participants’ verdicts, (b) gruesome photographs on their own increased convictions through increased disgust, and (c) participants who saw both living and gruesome murder victim photographs (versus gruesome alone) were more conviction prone due to increased anger and sympathy. These studies inform current debates regarding the controversial Victim Life Photo Act: Admitting living victim photographs during the guilt phase—if presented along with gruesome photographs—can make jurors more sympathetic and angry, which can increase convictions.

Juror impartiality is necessary for a fair and just legal system, but is true juror impartiality

realistic? The current study investigated the role of implicit and explicit social-cognitive biases in jurors’ conceptualizations of insanity, and the influence of those biases in juror verdict decisions. It was hypothesized that by analyzing the role of implicit and explicit biases in insanity defense cases, jurors’ attitudes towards those with mental illnesses and attitudes towards the insanity defense would influence jurors’ final verdict decisions. Two hundred and two participants completed an online survey which included a trial vignette incorporating an insanity defense (adapted from Maeder et al., 2016), the Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), Community Attitudes Towards the Mentally Ill Scale (Taylor & Dear, 1981), and an Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). While implicit associations concerning mental illness and dangerousness were significantly related to mock jurors’ verdicts, they no longer were when explicit insanity defense attitudes were added to a more complex model including all measured attitudes and biases. Insanity defense attitudes were significantly related to jurors’ verdicts over and above attitudes about the mentally ill and implicit biases concerning the mentally ill. The potentially biasing impact of jurors’ insanity defense attitudes and the impact of implicit associations about the mentally ill in legal judgments are discussed.

The purpose of this study was to examine mock jurors’ decision making in insanity cases. Specific instructions (vs. typical) juror instructions were tested to increase jurors’ comprehension of verdict options and reduce the effects of preexisting attitudes and reliance on cognitively biased thought processes in their legal decision making.

The specific instructions in this study were inspired by Fuzzy Trace Theory, which holds that simple language and visual aids that convey the ‘gist’ of complex information can help people make better decisions (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Participants (N= 496) were randomly assigned to one of two juror instruction conditions (specific vs. typical). All participants read a 10-page insanity defense case vignette, and were tasked with reaching a verdict. They were provided with 5 verdict options: Not Guilty, Guilty, and three different insanity options (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Guilty but Mentally Ill, Guilty Except Insane). Results supported the hypothesis that jurors who received specific (vs. typical) instructions would comprehend more information about the available verdicts, and would be more likely to choose an insanity defense verdict. As expected, jurors’ preexisting attitudes toward the insanity defense influenced their verdicts. Although it was hypothesized that increasing jurors’ understanding would result in them relying less on their attitudes and motivated reasoning processes in reaching their legal judgments, the evidence did not support this. Results suggest more specific instructions that includes information about outcomes is preferred by jurors, and that they are better able to understand and perform their duties when provided with more useful information. However, further research is needed to identify methods for helping jurors rely less on biased reasoning processes in their legal judgments.

Scientists, lawyers, and bioethicists have pondered the impact of scientifically deterministic evidence on a judge or jury when deciding the sentence of a criminal. Though the impact may be one that relieves the amount of personal guilt on the part of the criminal, this evidence may also be the very reason that a judge or jury punishes more strongly, suggesting that this type of evidence may be a double-edged sword. 118 participants were shown three films of fictional sentencing hearings. All three films introduced scientifically deterministic evidence, and participants were asked to recommend a prison sentence. Each hearing portrayed a different criminal with different neurological conditions, a different crime, and a different extent of argumentation during closing arguments about the scientifically deterministic evidence. Though the argumentation from the prosecution and the defense did not affect sentencing, the interaction of type of crime and neurological condition did.