This paper investigates the effect of the mismatch between workers' skills and the job requirements on the aggregate output and the earnings distribution. It develops a labor market model in which workers of different skills are allocated across jobs with different skill requirements, and this allocation is distorted by various government regulations. The model is calibrated to match the features of the earnings distribution and the extent of the skill mismatch reported by The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) for 2015. The model is then used to evaluate the economic outcomes of eliminating government regulations leading to skill mismatch. I find that such a change, despite an almost negligible effect on aggregate output, has quite a significant impact on the distribution of earnings. More formally, output increase by merely 0.045%, while wages allocated to routine workers increases by 1.77% and wages allocated to specialized workers reduced by 10.52%.

The returns to education in Haiti are high. Nevertheless, few individuals receive/enjoy them because education is privately provided, costly, and the poor cannot afford it. The poor receive too little education and would benefit from investing more into their education however, they cannot do so because they are unable to borrow, which can be attributed to the poorly functioning credit markets. Therefore, there is a need for government policy intervention aimed at providing more education to the poor. The purpose of this study is to propose and evaluate economic policies that might help the poor obtain more education. In particular, I analyze a taxation policy that redistributes income from the rich to the poor by implementing a tax transfer program. I also analyze a tax policy that taxes only the rich and used the tax revenue generated to fund public education for all children age 5-14. In the first policy, a tax rate of 3.17% on the rich and transfer to the poor increases the income of the poor parents by $81.74 USD a year and the income of the poor child by $61.78 USD while decreasing the income of the rich child by $61.78 USD. The second policy varies the amount parents and the government spend on a children's education and analyzes the effects on a children's income. I find that a fairly modest tax on the rich does a good job at generating more education for the poor, increasing the income of the poor children, and therefore alleviating the poverty of the poor. For example, a 5.21% tax on the top 20% of the rich raises enough money to provide six years of free public education for all children. As a result, the child's income in the poorest 20% of families raises from $539.30 to $887.14. These findings suggest that public education is likely an important channel through which the extent of poverty in Haiti can be reduced.

This dissertation consists of two chapters. Chapter one studies distortionary effects of tax exemption of employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) premiums. First, I argue that, in the competitive labor market, tax deductibility of ESHI premiums generates an implicit labor cost subsidy to the employers sponsoring health insurance (HI) which distorts the allocation of labor across employers. Second, I quantify the extent of this misallocation measured as output loss in a general equilibrium model of firm dynamics extended to incorporate tax exemption of ESHI premiums and endogenous provision of HI by the employers. The calibrated model shows that elimination of tax exemption increases aggregate output by 1.73%. About two-thirds of this effect comes from removing the misallocation of labor across existing establishments, and the remaining one-third comes from the increase in the number of operating establishments. Third, I use the model to analyze how tax exemption interacts with the employer mandate of the Affordable Care Act imposing a tax on large employers not sponsoring HI. Quantitative results show that implementing the employer mandate when the tax exemption is present reduces output by 0.13%.

Chapter two studies macroeconomic implications of a higher cost of health services faced by the unemployed which arise because 1) workers lose access to ESHI when they leave their jobs and 2) the uninsured face inflated health care prices. First, I provide evidence suggesting that the cost of health services for the privately insured is about 50% lower than for the uninsured. Second, I quantify the effects of higher cost of health services for the unemployed in the Lucas and Prescott (1974) island model extended to allow the workers to pay an extra cost of health services contingent on their employment status. Calibration procedure uses the differences between costs of health services for the privately insured and uninsured inferred from the data as a gap between costs of health services for the employed and unemployed. Quantitative results show that equalizing these costs across workers increases labor productivity by 1.2% and unemployment rate by 1.5 percentage points. The increased unemployment dominates quantitatively leading to a decrease in aggregate output by 0.26%.

This dissertation consists of two essays that deal with the development of open developing economies. These economies have experienced drastic divergence in terms of economic growth from the 1970s through the 2010s. One important feature of those countries that have lagged behind is their failure to build up their domestic innovation capacity.

Abstract The first chapter discusses the policies that may have an impact on the long-run innovation capacity of developing economies. The existing literature emphasizes that the backward linkage of foreign-owned firms is a key to determining whether FDI is beneficial or detrimental to a domestic economy. However, little empirical evidence has shown which aspects of FDI policies lead to a strong backward linkage between foreign-owned and domestic firms. This paper focuses on the foreign ownership structure of these foreign-owned firms. I show that joint ventures (i.e, firms with 1%-99% foreign share) have stronger backward linkages than MNC affiliates (i.e, firms with 100% foreign share) with domestic firms. I also find that the differences in backward linkages are strong enough to translate into a positive correlation between domestic innovation and the density of joint ventures and a negative correlation between domestic innovation and the density of MNC affiliates. Finally, I find that the channel through which foreign ownership structure affects domestic innovation raises innovation TFP in domestic firms. My results suggest that policies that affect the foreign ownership structure of foreign-owned firms could have a persistent effect on domestic innovation because they shift the comparative advantage of an developing economy towards the innovation sector in the long run.

Abstract The second chapter provides a unified theory to study what causes the divergence in economic growth of developing economies and how the innovation sector emerges in the developing countries. I show that open developing economies become trapped at the middle-income level because they tend not to specialize in sectors that generate spillover or factor accumulation (the innovation sector). Using a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model, I show that the fast growth of developing economies tends to end before they can fully catch up with the developed world, and the innovation sector will not operate in the developing countries. However, the successful growth stories of Korea and Taiwan challenge this view. In order to explore the economic miracle that happened in Korea and Taiwan, I generalize a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model by introducing technology adoption and explore how it generates spillovers to domestic innovation. I show that countries with policies that encourage technology adoption will benefit most from FDI: in addition to the fact that foreign technology raises productivity in the host country, the demand for skilled labor to adopt these technologies raises the education level in equilibrium, which benefits domestic innovation and leads to catch-up in the long run.