The purpose of this thesis is to establish how the Nuremberg trials set precedence for future war crime tribunals like the ICTY (the first tribunal since Nuremberg). An analyses of Hermann Goering is given in order to illustrate how his case, from its arguments and indictments to the structure of the court, is similar to Slobodan Milosevic's. These two are the most likely candidates to compare to due to their high ranking position in the political structure of their regime as well as having remarkable similarities to the conditions of their trail by the two tribunals

Through oral history and interviewing Veterans, I explored what military service looks like, and how diverse different service member's experiences are. I conducted comprehensive interviews with four Veterans: three Marines and an Army Medic. Each interview covered basic questions centered on enlistment, service/deployment, and the transition back into civilian life. After the interviews, I wrote interview summaries to provide a written account of the Veteran's experience. I also created a video compilation of the four veterans and their responses to certain questions. The objective of my project was to make the Veterans' experiences accessible to people without a military background.

This thesis is based on the responses of Soviet Displaced Persons collected by the Harvard Study on the Soviet Social System (HPSSS), an oral history conducted in Munich and New York from 1950 to 1951 in which former Soviet citizens were interviewed. They were primarily interviewed about daily life within the Soviet Union. A total of 331 displaced persons were interviewed over the course of the study, with most individuals receiving multiple interview sessions. These sessions were divided broadly as A and B sections. The A-section, which the majority of interviewees received and was viewed by the compilers as a broad sociological inquiry, was divided into subsections focusing on Soviet work, government, family, education, communication, philosophy of life, and ideology. The B-sections were used for deeper anthropological inquiries and are potentially more controversial due to the use of Rorschach tests and situational responses. Fewer respondents were continued on to the B interviews which contained a variety of subsections, though most respondents were only asked questions from one or two sections of the greater whole. A portion of the B section interviews do provide valuable insight to my thesis for their focus on the Displaced Person status of the interviewees. The project consisted of 764 separate interviews of the 331 respondents. The interviewers for the HPSSS were primarily graduate students, ranging from history, sociology, psychology and economics departments, with varying degrees of fluency in Russian and Ukrainian. Some of the interviewers went on to become leading experts in Soviet Studies in the years to follow. Others stopped publishing, following the major publication of the HPSSS in the late 1950s, which may indicate a move to the private sector or employment within the federal government rather than academics. While not possible to include within my analysis, the major publications of the study also included the insights garnered from nearly ten thousand written questionnaires of DPs that were tabulated and discarded prior to publication.

This dissertation describes the public sphere that coalesced in the Soviet jazz scene during Josef Stalin’s reign. Scholars debate the extent to which Soviet citizens, especially under Stalin, were coerced into cooperating with the regime through terror; willingly cooperated with the regime out of self-interest; or re-aligned their speech, behavior, and thoughts to conform to Bolshevik ideology and discourse. In all cases, citizens were generally unable to openly express their own opinions on what Soviet society should look like. In this dissertation, I attempt to bridge this gap by analyzing the diverse reactions to jazz music in Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union. I argue that audience engagement with jazz and discussions about the genre in the Soviet press and elsewhere were attempts to grapple with bigger questions of public concern about leisure, morality, ethnicity, cosmopolitanism and patriotism in a socialist society. This jazz public sphere was suppressed in the late 1940s and early 1950s because of Cold War paranoia and fears of foreign influences in Soviet life. In its place, a counterpublic sphere formed, in which jazz enthusiasts expressed views on socialism that were more open and contradictory to official norms. This counterpublic sphere foreshadowed aspects of post-Stalinist Soviet culture. To support my arguments, I employ archival documents such as fan mail and censorship records, periodicals, memoirs, and Stalin-era jazz recordings to determine the themes present in jazz music, how audiences reacted to them, and how these popular reactions overlapped with those of journalists, musicologists, bureaucrats, and composers. This project expands our understanding of when and where public spheres can form, challenges top-down interpretations of Soviet cultural policy, and illuminates the Soviet Union and Russia’s ambivalent relationship with the West and its culture.

This dissertation attempts to explain the variation in violence at the time of state secession. Why do some governments respond to secessionist demands with violence and others settle such disputes peacefully? Previous research emphasized the high value of the secessionist region, the state’s fear of a domino effect, and the political fragmentation of the state and secessionist region elites, as the primary explanations for the violent response of the state to secession. I seek to provide a more comprehensive theory for the variation of secessionist violence that integrates individual, regional, state, and international factors. Drawing on a rational choice approach, and recent research on dehumanization, I argue that the state’s response to secessionist claims depends on the degree of economic redistribution in the country, the cultural differential between the dominant group of the state and the secessionist group, and the international security of the state. My theory predicts that the state is less likely to use violence against secessionists when there is a high degree of economic redistribution, a small cultural difference between the dominant and secessionist group, and the state enjoys a high level of external security. A state willing to redistribute in favor of the secessionist region dampens support for secession in the region and reduces the need to use violence by the state. Due to cognitive biases of the human brain, it is easier to marginalize culturally distinct groups than culturally similar groups. As a result, a high cultural differential is often associated with greater probability of secessionist violence. When the international security of the state is under threat, the government of the state can more easily convince its population to use force against the secessionist region, regardless of other considerations. In sum, my theory implies that economic redistribution, cultural differences, and international security shape state responses to secessionist claims. I test these theoretical conjectures using a new dataset on peaceful and violent secessionist campaigns, along with several case studies based on field research and primary source materials and find strong supportive evidence for them.

The first official history of the Great Patriotic War appeared in the Soviet Union in 1960-1965. It evolved into a six-volume set that elicited both praise and criticism from the reading public. This dissertation examines the creation of the historiographical narrative of the Great Patriotic War in the decade following de-Stalinization in 1956. The debates historians, Party and state representatives engaged in, including the responses they received from reviewers and readers, shed new light on the relationship between the government, those who wrote state-sponsored narratives, and the reading public.

The narrative examined here shows the importance and value placed on the war effort, and explores how aspects of the Stalinist period were retained during the Thaw. By focusing on previously unexplored archival material, which documents debates and editorial decisions, an examination of how officials sought to control the state’s explanation of events, motivations and consequences of the war can be examined in-depth. To date, the periodization, terminology and areas of concentration that define the course of the Great Patriotic War are fixated on topics that Stalin’s war narrative favored, assigning significance to events according to Stalinist preferences rather than objective analysis. My study of the war’s historiography shows how contentious its memory became at every level, making it difficult to clearly discern who represented and opposed the party line throughout Soviet society.

The author argues that the collective memory of the war, as propagated by the state, became so all-encompassing that it was often the preferred version, infiltrating individual memories and displacing or blending with personal recollections and factual documentation. Because the war touched the entire population of the Soviet Union, its story became the foundational myth of the USSR, replacing the October Revolution, and was used as a legitimizing tool by Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. Most recently, it has experienced a revival in the post-Soviet period by Vladimir Putin as a way to unify Russia and build popular support for his administration. Viewing how the public interacted with representatives of the state over the creation of the official history of the war suggests that like no other event, war compels any state, even a totalitarian state, to reexamine its foundations, historical memory, foreign and domestic policies and views on censorship.

One of the great hallmarks of Russian life during the nineteenth century was the proliferation of alternative identities at nearly every level of society. Individuals found, created, or adopted new ways of self-identifying oneself vis-à-vis religion, nationality, and politics. This project examines the life of Daniil Avraamovich Khvol'son (1819-1911) and his understanding of his identity--from poor Lithuanian Jew to German educated scholar, to leading defendant of Jews accused of ritual murder, to renowned university professor. Khvol'son is often mentioned in works of the period but remains understudied and, as a result, poorly understood. This dissertation is the first to examine the man's life and times, his scholarly and public writings, as well as available commentaries about him from former students, opponents, and colleagues. This project is based on the available archival sources housed in the central archives of Russia and draws upon the different literary venues in which Khvol'son published during his lifetime. While it provides a broad biography of the man, more importantly, it takes on the content of his writing, the themes he explored, and the ways in which his contributions were viewed within their own time. This project argues that the aim of Russian imperial policy toward Jews was based on a hopeful, if hesitant, desire to gradually bring Jews into the state's service. Khvol'son was among the most successful of those candidates who received a world-class German education, a position within the state, and an opportunity to participate fully within Russian intellectual circles. However, Khvol'son's legacy is complex because he promoted a radical rethinking of Christian understanding of Jews and Judaism and by doing so, he challenged the Orthodox world to reconsider in a deeply personal way the ongoing persecutions of Jews based on false tales about them and their religion. Khvol'son painstakingly challenged the blood libel and sought to prove that it was not based in any identifiable reality but perpetuated an un-Christian worldview that demonized and vilified Jews. In doing so, Khvol'son formulated a controversial self-understanding for his position in society as situated between two diametrically opposed worlds--one Christian, the other Jewish.

Ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals in Mostar espoused a discourse of ethno-exclusionist sociocultural relations as a superstructure for the public in order to establish ethnocratic kleptocracies where they concealed their criminal colonization of residential and commercial property through manipulating the pre-Bosnian War discourse on property relations. This is not to argue that some or most of these politicians and criminals did not believe in their virulent nationalist rhetoric, but instead that the effects of the discourse created well-used pathways to personal, not community, wealth. Elites used the Yugoslav economic crisis and perceived past grievance to enflame growing tensions between ethnicities and social classes. I use Mostar as an object of analysis to examine the creation of Bosnian Croat and Bosniak ethnocratic regimes in this divided city. However, I focus more on the Bosnian Croat regime in the city because it envisioned Mostar as its capital, making the city the site of its political competition among factions. Even though ethno-nationalist politicians and criminals still hold a level of power in Mostar, the IC did succeed in instituting a high level of property restitution, which does not necessarily imply return, because the IC was able to impose rule of law when it acted in an organized manner. Also, the ethnocratic regimes were weakened due to regional economic and political factors that undercut the regimes' hold over the population.