Why do states repress sexual minorities? The logic of coercive responsiveness demonstrates that states repress people when they feel threatened. From this perspective and because repression leaves states with international condemnations and sanctions, it is puzzling why states target sexual minorities. First, I explore this puzzle in all states and argue that political regimes repress sexual minorities when their legitimacy is undermined. Repression of sexual minorities becomes a legitimation strategy for political regimes in homophobic societies especially when regimes lack rational-procedural legitimacy. Second, I examine state repression of LGBTQ+ people in conservative countries and argue that political regimes in homophobic societies tend to repress sexual minorities to divert public attention from domestic economic problems. Corruption, government ineffectiveness, and uneven economic development sprout public resentment and discontent. Political regimes act to repress sexual minorities, implementing homophobic policies to divert public attention from poor economic conditions and discourage citizens from demanding redistributive policies. Instilling homophobic elements into nationalist diversionary tactics makes these tactics more appealing to a broader society where traditional family values and normative homosexuality is blended with national identity. Third, I study the repression of sexual minorities in authoritarian countries and argue that regimes which oppose the US-led international liberal order are more likely to repress sexual minorities. Political leaders in these regimes commit egregious human rights abuses against sexual minorities to draw attention from Western media and gay rights organizations, which press Western governments to make condemnations and sometimes impose sanctions. Leaders in these anti-Western then frame these condemnations and sanctions as threats to sovereignty and cultural imperialism, which become appealing to the homophobic public. Testing these conjectures against new country-year data, survey experiments, and five public surveys, I find results consistent with these arguments. The results suggest that state repression has both domestic and external dimensions. Homosexuality is highly politicized in repressive countries. Leaders resort to violence against sexual minorities for various political gains when the public is hostile to homosexuality. I conclude that public acceptance of LGBTQ+ people is paramount to the improvement of gay rights.

In this paper, I define a religious-political phenomenon called cultist terror groups. A cultist terror (ct) group is a nationalist insurgent organization which employs extreme, ritualized violence, and establishes a cultist doctrine, commonly borrowing elements from established religions. IS, or the Islamic State, is the latest example of a cultist terror group. This paper examines and contextualizes IS by analyzing death cults throughout modern history, and contrasts these case studies with violent, religious, political groups that do not meet the heuristic characteristics of a cultist terror group. Cultist terror groups are so named to drive home the idea that these groups belong to a subset of the broader, religious terror (rt) group category. The paper aims to discern the key components of cultist terror groups that distinguish these groups from other violent, religious groups with political goals (a political theology). These include identity and strategy components. Specifically, it presents a concise set of hypotheses about how cultist terror groups create in-group solidarity (e.g., through synchronous activities), recruit members, prevent defection, select targets, and how these aspects differentiate cultist terror groups from other violent religious organizations with political theologies.

This dissertation attempts to explain the variation in violence at the time of state secession. Why do some governments respond to secessionist demands with violence and others settle such disputes peacefully? Previous research emphasized the high value of the secessionist region, the state’s fear of a domino effect, and the political fragmentation of the state and secessionist region elites, as the primary explanations for the violent response of the state to secession. I seek to provide a more comprehensive theory for the variation of secessionist violence that integrates individual, regional, state, and international factors. Drawing on a rational choice approach, and recent research on dehumanization, I argue that the state’s response to secessionist claims depends on the degree of economic redistribution in the country, the cultural differential between the dominant group of the state and the secessionist group, and the international security of the state. My theory predicts that the state is less likely to use violence against secessionists when there is a high degree of economic redistribution, a small cultural difference between the dominant and secessionist group, and the state enjoys a high level of external security. A state willing to redistribute in favor of the secessionist region dampens support for secession in the region and reduces the need to use violence by the state. Due to cognitive biases of the human brain, it is easier to marginalize culturally distinct groups than culturally similar groups. As a result, a high cultural differential is often associated with greater probability of secessionist violence. When the international security of the state is under threat, the government of the state can more easily convince its population to use force against the secessionist region, regardless of other considerations. In sum, my theory implies that economic redistribution, cultural differences, and international security shape state responses to secessionist claims. I test these theoretical conjectures using a new dataset on peaceful and violent secessionist campaigns, along with several case studies based on field research and primary source materials and find strong supportive evidence for them.