Alexis de Tocqueville, French political theorist and scientist, theorized in the 19th century that “France cannot reform except through revolution” (Heisbourg, 2016). As France continues to face a strained economy with high unemployment and stalled growth, the OECD recommends that France should implement labor reform “to promote job growth” (OECD, 2015). Labor reform refers to removing labor protections for French employees, resulting in an increase in firing and hiring flexibility for employers.

Recent governments in France have failed to bring about meaningful labor reform, faced with opposition in the streets or within their own political party. The election of Emanuel Macron, viewed as a political outsider who had never held elected office created his own political party, En Marche, seemed like the catalyst to lasting economic reform. However, if high unemployment and slow economic growth to comparable economies have been concerns for France since the beginning of the 21st century, why were past governments unsuccessful in implementing legislative actions to address labor reform?

This paper will argue that the election of Macron and the establishment of En Marche was caused by a shift in power that allowed Macron enough support to sway the political landscape of France and implement labor market reform. This largely has to do with the power struggle between France’s Outsiders, “those without secure employment, Insiders, “those with secure employment” and the Upscale group, “employers, the upper middle class, and the business and financial community” (Rudea, 2007). However, the degree and preservation of Macron’s reform plans are threatened by Insiders who have been stripped of employee protections.