The interplay between individual behaviors and epidemic dynamics in complex networks is a topic of recent interest. In particular, individuals can obtain different types of information about the disease and respond by altering their behaviors, and this can affect the spreading dynamics, possibly in a significant way. We propose a model where individuals' behavioral response is based on a generic type of local information, i.e., the number of neighbors that has been infected with the disease. Mathematically, the response can be characterized by a reduction in the transmission rate by a factor that depends on the number of infected neighbors. Utilizing the standard susceptible-infected-susceptible and susceptible-infected-recovery dynamical models for epidemic spreading, we derive a theoretical formula for the epidemic threshold and provide numerical verification. Our analysis lays on a solid quantitative footing the intuition that individual behavioral response can in general suppress epidemic spreading. Furthermore, we find that the hub nodes play the role of “double-edged sword” in that they can either suppress or promote outbreak, depending on their responses to the epidemic, providing additional support for the idea that these nodes are key to controlling epidemic spreading in complex networks.

How effective are governmental incentives to achieve widespread vaccination coverage so as to prevent epidemic outbreak? The answer largely depends on the complex interplay among the type of incentive, individual behavioral responses, and the intrinsic epidemic dynamics. By incorporating evolutionary games into epidemic dynamics, we investigate the effects of two types of incentives strategies: partial-subsidy policy in which certain fraction of the cost of vaccination is offset, and free-subsidy policy in which donees are randomly selected and vaccinated at no cost. Through mean-field analysis and computations, we find that, under the partial-subsidy policy, the vaccination coverage depends monotonically on the sensitivity of individuals to payoff difference, but the dependence is non-monotonous for the free-subsidy policy. Due to the role models of the donees for relatively irrational individuals and the unchanged strategies of the donees for rational individuals, the free-subsidy policy can in general lead to higher vaccination coverage. Our findings indicate that any disease-control policy should be exercised with extreme care: its success depends on the complex interplay among the intrinsic mathematical rules of epidemic spreading, governmental policies, and behavioral responses of individuals.