Existing work suggests that intergroup negativity is caused by dissimilarities of values between groups. In contrast, I propose that incompatible values--regardless of whether they are similar or dissimilar--cause intergroup negativities. Because values act as cues to tangible goals and interests, groups' values suggest desired outcomes that may conflict with our own (i.e., incompatible values). The current study conceptually and empirically disentangles value-dissimilarity and value-incompatibility, which were confounded in previous research. Results indicated that intergroup negativities were strongly predicted by value-incompatibility, and only weakly and inconsistently predicted by value-dissimilarity. I further predicted that groups' values cue specific threats and opportunities to perceivers and that, in reaction to these inferred affordances, people will experience threat-relevant, specific emotional reactions (e.g., anger, disgust); however, results did not support this prediction. I also predicted that, because the inferred threats that groups pose to one another are not always symmetric, the negativities between groups may sometimes be asymmetric (i.e., Group A feels negatively toward Group B, but Group B feels neutral or positively toward Group A). This prediction received strong support. In sum, reframing our understanding of values as cues to conflicts-of-interest between groups provides principles for understanding intergroup prejudices in more nuanced ways.