This thesis paper discusses the interplay between the intelligence community and the United Nations (UN) governing body, namely the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in the detection and dismantlement of undeclared weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. With the intelligence community uncovering almost all of the clandestine nuclear programs that have occurred in the world, it is important to ask if the intelligence community has an inappropriate amount of power over an objective UN structure. The cases of Iraq and Libya are used to highlight the relationship between major intelligence agencies and the IAEA as well as the existence of intermediary agencies created by the UN in special cases. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) were both created to ensure Iraq's compliance with international weapons regulations. These appeared to be entirely autonomous and objective, which may have clashed with the intelligence community. However, research has proven that UNSCOM faced criticism for its connection to US intelligence agencies which UNMOVIC attempted to correct. Yet, the US was still able to utilize false intelligence that allowed them to internally justify a preemptive strike on Iraq. This disproven intelligence eventually ostracized the US intelligence community. The clear disregard for the expertise of the IAEA and the disapproval of the UN delegitimized both institutions. When Libya decided to dismantle its weapons programs, it answered to President Bush in the US and Prime Minister Blair in the UK. These communities kept the Libyan cooperation from the UN and IAEA until it could benefit their own nations. This type of power delegitimizes the UN regime and destabilizes an objective system. The ensuing struggle for jurisdiction and mandate confusion exemplified the confusion between a strong intelligence community and an unbiased international regime.