In recent years, the proliferation of deep neural networks (DNNs) has revolutionized the field of artificial intelligence, enabling advancements in various domains. With the emergence of efficient learning techniques such as quantization and distributed learning, DNN systems have become increasingly accessible for deployment on edge devices. This accessibility brings significant benefits, including real-time inference on the edge, which mitigates communication latency, and on-device learning, which addresses privacy concerns and enables continuous improvement. However, the resource limitations of edge devices pose challenges in equipping them with robust safety protocols, making them vulnerable to various attacks. Two notable attacks that affect edge DNN systems are Bit-Flip Attacks (BFA) and architecture stealing attacks. BFA compromises the integrity of DNN models, while architecture stealing attacks aim to extract valuable intellectual property by reverse engineering the model's architecture. Furthermore, in Split Federated Learning (SFL) scenarios, where training occurs on distributed edge devices, Model Inversion (MI) attacks can reconstruct clients' data, and Model Extraction (ME) attacks can extract sensitive model parameters. This thesis aims to address these four attack scenarios and develop effective defense mechanisms. To defend against BFA, both passive and active defensive strategies are discussed. Furthermore, for both model inference and training, architecture stealing attacks are mitigated through novel defense techniques, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of edge DNN systems. In the context of SFL, the thesis showcases defense mechanisms against MI attacks for both supervised and self-supervised learning applications. Additionally, the research investigates ME attacks in SFL and proposes countermeasures to enhance resistance against potential ME attackers. By examining and addressing these attack scenarios, this research contributes to the security and privacy enhancement of edge DNN systems. The proposed defense mechanisms enable safer deployment of DNN models on resource-constrained edge devices, facilitating the advancement of real-time applications, preserving data privacy, and fostering the widespread adoption of edge computing technologies.