As Charles Darwin’s evolution theory reveals, it is not the strongest species that survive, but those most responsive to change. This principle also applies in the realm of operations management, where managers shall creatively redesign operations to address new challenges. This dissertation presents three cases where renovating traditional operations cost-effectively solves emerging problems, including fraudulent reviews on online platforms (Chapter 1), inefficient strategy design of advertisers (Chapter 2), and inadequate user participation in global procurement initiatives (Chapter 3). I demonstrate that such a practice not only enhances operational efficiency but promotes social welfare. The first two chapters examine operational renovation in the private sector, while the third focuses on the public sector. Specifically, Chapter 1 investigates sellers’ review manipulation on e-commerce platforms and shows that platforms may not be as committed to combating fake reviews as they claim to be. To mitigate this problem, I craft a game-theoretic model and illustrate that restructuring return policies – an essential, long-established operation – can inhibit review manipulation. Chapter 2 analyzes geofencing, an emerging advertising strategy that enables advertisers to send ads to consumers within a virtual fencing zone. While extant literature shows the usefulness of geofencing, the optimal implementation of the strategy remains unclear. Therefore, I analytically examine the optimal operations of geofencing. The findings suggest that the typical practice of setting the geofence around the advertiser’s store is not cost-efficient. Advertisers shall think outside of the box and consider placing the fencing zone elsewhere. My proposed geofencing location and radius could increase resource utilization, advertising efficacy, and consumer welfare. Chapter 3 switches the focus to the public sector, addressing the unaffordability of health products in low- to middle-income countries (LMICs). Social planners have managed procurement pools to help LMICs access health products, yet countries’ willingness to join the pool can vary greatly. A lack of country participation would jeopardize the success of pooled procurement. To encourage more countries to join, I design a procurement mechanism that considers countries’ heterogeneous preferences, disease burdens, and ability to pay. This proposed mechanism, with an appropriately designed subsidy plan, could maximize the aggregate social welfare.