Currently, supply chain finance takes various forms such as factoring, pledge financing, and commercial acceptance bills. It has evolved from being predominantly led by commercial banks to spontaneously emerging within the physical industrial chains. It has also gradually integrated innovations in financial technology, resulting in a flourishing landscape. It is foreseeable that in China, where indirect financing and debt financing are currently mainstream and there are numerous manufacturing enterprises, supply chain finance will gradually replace the traditional credit model that relies primarily on the creditworthiness of the borrowing entity. This study focuses on supply chain finance within China's manufacturing industry clusters, examining its role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and the real economy. Currently, supply chain finance in China is diversified, encompassing products like factoring, inventory financing, and commercial acceptance bills. This research takes the supply chain of a Fortune Global 500 manufacturing company as a case study, analyzing transaction and supply chain finance data from hundreds of companies. The focus is on assessing the impact of supply chain finance products on transaction prices, stability for SMEs, and the cost implications for core enterprises. It also explores who ultimately bears the cost of supply chain finance and how it is transmitted along the supply chain. Through in-depth analysis, the study reveals the potential benefits of supply chain finance in promoting industry chain synergy, reducing transaction costs, and enhancing transaction efficiency. It is observed that while supply chain finance provides liquidity benefits for SMEs, it also significantly impacts the cost structure and competitiveness of core enterprises. The study also notes that in China's financial system, where commercial banks dominate, insensitivity to commodity transactions and prices may limit the depth of integration and effectiveness of supply chain finance. In summary, this research not only provides empirical support for supply chain finance within manufacturing industry clusters but also offers insights for commercial banks and policymakers on optimizing financial products and strategies.

With regard to business modules in Chinese delivery services companies, there has long been a heated debate on whether franchising or direct management is the better module for Chinese market. But most prior discussion was lightweight, unconvincing and without any theoretical framework.

This research examines three major management problems in Chinese delivery services: 1. The reason for choosing franchising module, 2. The relationship between franchising module and implementation of the product, 3. The functions of IT in delivery services. By reviewing theories on enterprise boundary and summarizing the six features of franchising contracts in Chinese delivery business as well as the five properties of delivery products, two contract models are finally set up with five beneficial conclusions which are proved by a very solid empirical data analysis.

The purpose of this research is to either support or weaken the current theories on enterprise boundary as well as to offer meaningful inspirations for the management of express delivery companies in China.

While agency problems inevitably exist in buyer-supplier relationships, the focus on how to overcome such problems has been confined to the buyer-supplier dyad as if the dyad exists in isolation. In this dissertation, I re-frame the agency problems beyond the dyadic relationship between a buyer and its supplier and suggest a new way to overcome agency problems. While the current Agency Theory suggests that the buyer can monitor and provide incentives to mitigate the agency problems, I propose to look beyond the dyad in addressing buyer-supplier agency problems.

In the first chapter, I examine the impact of the “indirect links” in which the buyer is connected to the supplier through a third actor. I propose a conceptual framework that specifies how the indirect links can overcome agency problems through the effects of information exchange, mutual monitoring, power change, and network governance. These different effects are enabled by the indirect links based on the different network positions and levels of connectivity of the third actor. The first chapter provides a theoretical framework for Chapter 2 and 3.

In Chapter 2, the effect of network governance enabled by the indirect links is investigated. In particular, two scenario-based role-play experiments were conducted with managers to examine the effects of dyadic and network governance mechanisms on supplier opportunism. In Study 1, the participants took the perspective of a supplier, while in Study 2, the participants took the role of a buyer. The results show that network governance mechanism reduces the supplier's opportunistic behavioral intentions directly and indirectly through the negative affection prediction, and while suppliers may overlook the buyer's reactions as they make decisions, the buyers are likely to react against the supplier, such as engage in negative word-of-mouth or reduce level of commitment.

Finally, directed sourcing, a direct application of how a buyer could overcome agency problems beyond the dyad, is examined in Chapter 3. Directed sourcing is an emerging sourcing practice in which the buying firms bypass the top-tier suppliers and directly manage or contract with lower-tier suppliers, and research on this new practice is in its infancy. Therefore, multi-tier multi-task principal-agent models are developed to investigate the effect of directed sourcing practice on each member in this three-tier supply chain, comparing with traditional tiered sourcing. The results show that directed sourcing generally benefits the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and the lower-tier supplier, while it harms the top-tier supplier. Yet, directed sourcing is not always beneficial to the OEM. Therefore, an OEM should be selective in implementing this new strategy.