Since the 2008 financial crisis, the total assets managed by U.S. mutual funds have frequently hit new highs and the industry has become increasingly concentrated. In the meantime, two strategies have emerged in the American mutual fund industry: active and passive management. What factors affect the market shares of firms that adopted these two different strategies?

Building on strategic management theories, I suggest that mutual fund families that adopted active and passive management strategies tend to compete in different dimensions. Active management fund families tend to implement the product differentiation strategy, competing on “product quality” through excess-returns, innovative and differentiated fund products; passively managed fund families focus more on "price competition" by conducting an overall cost leadership strategy.

This research examines the driven factors of fund families’ market share. The results show that: the market share of actively managed fund families is more sensitive to positive impact of fund performance, while passive management firms are more sensitive to negative effect of management fees and total loads; 12b-1 expense improves the competitiveness of active fund families and thus enhance their market shares but it has negative impact on passive fund families. In addition, high turnover decreases the market share of all fund families, especially for passively managed families. The outcome reveals the latest US mutual industry orientation: products differentiation, turnover, management fee have greater impact on market share while the competition of fund performance is diminishing. The Matthew effect in US mutual fund industry is outstanding. Industrial competition dimension expands from performance and products to cost cutting.

Empirical analysis on Chinese mutual fund families is also conducted. Different from the US, there is only small number of mutual fund families targeting passive management products. The results show that the distribution channel has the largest impact on Chinese mutual fund family market share and investors are more willing to chase performance than to consider cost-efficient fund families. This study then analyses reasons behind the difference of Chinese and American mutual fund industries.

This dissertation focuses on risk prevention and regulatory issues of financial asset trading platforms, exploring the composition of a financial asset trading platform and its risks, formulating the general framework of platform risk prevention and regulation, and discussing the methodologies for monitoring and managing the risk of financial assets trading platform. The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter is the introduction, which discusses the current status in this research field, the motivation and significance of the research topic. The second chapter discusses the transaction cost theory, information asymmetry theory, financial risk management theory, financial supervision theory and other related basic theories related to financial asset trading platform risk prevention and supervision. The third chapter presents the definition, the main types, the generating mechanism and the transmission mechanism of the financial asset trading platform. The fourth chapter elaborates theoretically on the general framework of financial asset trading platform risk prevention and supervision based on the aspects of basic principles, key tasks, applicable methods and constituent elements. The fifth chapter discusses the performance of financial asset trading business, asset return trading business, financing business and information coupling business on financial asset trading platforms, and analyzes the risk prevention of financial asset trading platforms from a business perspective. The sixth chapter discusses the development of financial asset trading platforms in developed countries, and summarizes the experience and practice of their risk prevention and supervision based on four categories of business lines. On this basis, the dissertation draws the inspiration and implications for the future development of the trading platforms in our country. The seventh chapter puts forward policy recommendations regarding risk prevention and supervision of financial asset trading platforms in five aspects: legal positioning, credit information system, protection of consumer rights, self-discipline management and business supervision.

After the 2008 financial crisis, along with information technology and its application

innovation into the burst period, Shared faster economic growth, and then entered into a

rapid expansion in 2014, quickly penetrate into many areas and market segments.

As the securities industry practitioners and Internet financial practitioners, I am

very concerned about sharing economic model in the development of securities

investment niche. As the Internet and mobile penetration rate rise in recent years, the

Internet financial in the rapid development of our country, investors get used for

investment decision-making information via the Internet. Internet social investment

sharing platform based on knowledge sharing and rapid development, has formed

"opinion leaders", "combined with", "automated financial innovation model". The

emergence of these new patterns, provide investors with investment of knowledge sharing,

the investors behavior changes, many small and medium-sized investors into social

sharing platform for the combination of investment talent information and follow orders,

and centered on investment talent view form fan interaction.

This article around the "Shared economic environment on the impact of portfolio

share on investor behavior research," the theme, the relevant literature and resources, and

to detect Shared economic environment provided by the social share portfolio, whether to

change the traditional information decision and disadvantages of small and medium-sized

investors, whether really improved the small and medium-sized investors return on

investment, its conclusion try to explain the traditional period research literature on active

investment and passive investment, the relevant conclusions of small and medium-sized

investors and institutional investors, sharing in the Internet the rapid development of

economic period is changed.

Shareholder Activism is a mechanism by which investors who hold a significant but

non-majority percentage of a company’s stock, exercise their voting rights, participate in

corporate governance and influence operational decisions of target companies. The

purpose is improve corporate governance, increase firm performance and boost share

-holders’ returns. Existing studies of shareholder activism, based largely in mature

capital markets like the US, come to different conclusions regarding its impact on firm

performance.

In this paper, I collect data on shareholder activism events in the China A Share

market between 2006 and 2016. The sample includes 60 companies targeted by 42

activist investors over this period. I find that institutional investors, typically industrial

capital and private funds, playing an increasingly important role in corporate governance

of Chinese listed companies through activism. The disclosure of the holdings of activists

results in large gains in the target firm. I also find subsequent improvements in long

-term operational performance of target firms. Activist investors in China focus on

smaller targets and those characterized by higher agency costs and lower operating

performance. Activists appear to be largely concerned with improvements in business

strategy and M&A activity. Non-hostile behavior is more likely to be related to successful

activism in China. In addition to statistical evidence, I present case studies of the

“BaoWan dispute” and the activist investment of Butterfly Capital in two firms,

“Guonong” and “Xiuqiang”. The case studies highlight the mechanism employed by these

firms to influence performance.

I conclude with policy recommendations and direction for further research.

During the past decade, the Chinese bond market has been rapidly developing. The percentage of bond to total social funding is constantly increasing. The structure and behavior of investors are crucial to the construction of China’s bond market. Due to specific credit risks, bond market regulation usually involves in rules to control investor adequancy. It is heatedly discussed among academia and regulators about whether individual investors are adequate to directly participate in bond trading. This paper focuses on the comparison between individual and institutional bond investors, especially their returns and risks. Based on the comparison, this paper provides constructive suggestions for China’s bond market development and the bond market investor structure.