The traditional action-response perspective has largely ignored the role of language in competitive dynamics. In this study, I treat language (i.e., word response) as an alternative way to react to rivals when a firm is attacked, in addition to no reaction and action-based reaction. Word response is a specific and public announcement of a focal firm’s potential move in reaction to a competitor’s word or action attack. To explore the underlying mechanism behind word responses, I aim to answer two major questions. The first question is under what situations are responders motivated to use words as competitive responses? For this question I emphasize characteristics of the action, the market, and the actor, using measures such as action type, market dependence of the responder, multimarket contact of the responder in the market, and the competitive aggressiveness of the actor. The second question is what kinds of responders are more likely to use words as competitive responses? For this question, I focus on responder characteristics, such as firm reputation, CEO tenure, and CEO duality. According to Porter’s competitive signaling theory, I argue that responders can use words in reaction to an attack in order to test the waters, deter rivalry, and demonstrate toughness because word responses require few resources, can be accomplished quickly, are reversible, while at the same time still carrying some commitment. Besides incorporating language into the action-response perspective, my dissertation also further integrates the upper-echelons perspective with competitive dynamics research, providing a more realistic and complete understanding of competitive engagement. I test my theory in the consumer electronics (CE) industry with 20 major global CE manufacturers between 2007 and 2014.

Over the past several decades, social network remains the most prevalent and prominent in the strategy and organization theory literature. However, despite the considerable research attention scholars devoted to exploring the implications and mechanisms of social ties and networks in management and organizational contexts, the following question has largely remained understudied: To what extent can top managers' personal ties and networks actually contribute to their firms? This thesis will strive to explore this research question by theoretically highlighting three logically consequent managerial decisions: (1) "When"--when will top managers choose to use their personal ties and networks in their firms; (2) "How"--will top managers use their managerial ties and networks to serve the best interest of their firms or to satisfy their self-interests; and (3) "So what" --how would the decision of using managerial ties and networks to benefit their firms influence other decisions of the firms. Using both primary data and archival information from Chinese firms, I will empirically test the step-wise framework. I expect this thesis to contribute to both strategic leadership and social network research and management practices.