Strategic Analysis of Censorship and Dissent

Nations censor specific information in accordance with their political, legal, and cultural standards. Each country adopts unique approaches and regulations for censorship, whether it involves moderating online content or prohibiting protests. This paper seeks to study the underlying motivations for the disparate behaviors exhibited by authorities and individuals. To achieve this, we develop a mathematical model designed to understand the dynamics between authority figures and individuals, analyzing their behaviors under various conditions. We argue that individuals essentially act in three phases - compliance, self-censoring, and defiance when faced with different situations under their own desires and the authority's parameters. We substantiate our findings by conducting different simulations on the model and visualizing the outcomes. Through these simulations, we realize why individuals exhibit behaviors falling into one of three categories, who are influenced by factors such as the level of surveillance imposed by the authority, the severity of punishments, the tolerance for dissent, or the individuals' boldness. This also helped us to understand why certain populations in a country exhibit defiance, self-censoring behavior, or compliance as they interact with each other and behave under specific conditions within a small network world.