The role of futures markets for the design and performance of incentive based environmental policy: a study of the sulfur financial instrument and European Union allowance

This dissertation outlines the role that futures markets for tradable permits can play in improving the performance of incentive based policies for environmental externalities. An extensive literature on tradable permits exists. However, to my knowledge, the role of futures contracts as an instrument for responding to permit price uncertainty has not been considered, nor has their pricing performance in this role been examined. This research provides a theoretical description of how futures can be used to manage the price uncertainty associated with permit purchases. It then evaluates if the futures contract performance for the former U.S. Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) and the existing EU Carbon Dioxide (CO2) futures markets are consistent with the theoretical constructs. Overall, for the short time horizons examined, futures are the best information source regarding later permit prices for both markets examined. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, this implies futures markets can be looked to as a forecast of the incremental costs of emission control. The theory illustrates that firms can then use futures to eliminate the negative effects of permit price uncertainty and restore policy compliance cost minimization. These results demonstrate that an ideal futures market for emission permits can enhance policy performance.