What we think people can be said to deserve has far-reaching implications. Desert presents some challenging questions about the institution of punishment (retributive justice) and the structures in society regulating distributions of scarce goods (distributive justice). For the distributive side, questions include: Can people be said to deserve the wealth they earn? Do people deserve the talents that give them advantages within the market? And for the retributive side: What punishments do criminals deserve? What justifies the decision to punish someone who commits a crime? These questions and more arise when philosophers write on desert in relation to distributive and retributive justice. John Rawls presents us with a view of distributive desert that some find problematic when it is applied to retributive justice. As a result, additional questions arise about whether desert can be treated differently in distributive and retributive justice. Section I of my paper sketches the tension within Rawls's views on distributive and retributive justice. Since this tension is best framed in terms of desert, the remaining sections heavily focus on that concept. Section II presents Samuel Scheffler's solution to the tension in Rawls's views. Section III covers Jeffrey Moriarty's criticisms of the arguments Scheffler advances. Section IV discusses Jake Greenblum's criticisms of Scheffler's assessment of Rawls. In Section V, I evaluate the philosophers' positions and offer my conclusions on desert's proper role within distributive and retributive justice.

The Paradox of Fiction can be understood as the acceptance of three plausible but inconsistent claims: Claim 1. We are genuinely moved by fiction Claim 2. We know that what is portrayed by fiction is not actual Claim 3. We are only genuinely moved by what we believe is actual. Taken individually, we intuitively accept each of the claims, however, they form a contradiction when taken together. The issue at hand is although we observe many instances of fiction moving a spectator/reader to tears, we know that the grief we observe does not reference an existent entity. How can we grieve at the death of Mercutio in "Romeo and Juliet" when Mercutio never existed let alone died? How can we fear a monster we know exists only in the world of a film? Many theories have been proposed to dissolve this paradox, and I focus on the ones that approach the puzzle by rejecting one of the above three claims. I examine some of these theories and explain why they fail to solve the paradox, and in doing so I demonstrate that the Make-Believe Theory succeeds where the others failed. Make-Believe Theory rejects Claim 1 and I shall prove that although unintuitive, we are completely justified in claiming that we are not genuinely moved by fiction. Instead, when we are moved by fictions, we are moved in a similar way to how a child is moved in a game of make-believe.

In this discussion I will state fundamental principles of Kelsen's Legal Positivism in International Law and explain four problems with his theory. I will then propose two suggestions in the light of which Kelsen's theory is modified in this discussion and explain how these two suggestions address the four problems and help the theory account for regime change. Finally, I will address possible objections to the view advanced in this discussion.

Libertarians affirm the right to liberty, i.e., the right to do what one wants free from interference. Libertarians also affirm the right to private property. One objection to libertarianism is that private property relations restrict liberty. This objection appears to have the consequence that libertarianism is an incoherent position. I examine Jan Narveson's version of the libertarian view and his defense of its coherence. Narveson understands the right to liberty as a prohibition on the initiation of force. I argue that if that is what the right to liberty is, then the enforcement of property rights violates it. I also examine Narveson's attempt to support private property with his distinction between interference with and mere prevention of activity and argue that this distinction does not do the work that he needs it to do. My conclusion is that libertarianism is, in a sense, impossible because conceptually unsound.