No Choice but to Choose: The Technopolitics of Informed Consent

Informed Consent is a ubiquitous way of enshrining choice in the United States which regulates social relations in domains as varied as health, research, access to institutions, and prisons. Informed consent describes an imagined epistemic relationship between right knowledge and legitimate choice, where judgements of capacitation determine whether a person is the right sort of person to take up knowledge which will render them agential under conditions of asymmetrical power. It has been developed over and over to solve problems of injustice, where the injustice in question is understood in terms of undue infringement on individual autonomy, and the logic of informed consent is re-invented to reframe the problem at hand as a rightful matter of individual choice. It is imagined to respect autonomy, and to perform a transformative "moral magic" that makes the forbidden quotidian. This dissertation develops this account of informed consent through a series of cases, each of which explicates different aspects of the technopolitics of informed consent. It begins with genetic counseling as a paradigm case in the logic of informed consent: a well-developed field that emerged to inform people about genetics and genomics in the interest not only of individual reproductive choice, but in opposition to eugenic shaping of populations through genetic knowledge. Next, pro- and anti- abortion deployments of informed consent illustrate an epistemology of information itself, which is understood to agentialize as well as to serve as a site for refusing choice to those deemed incapacitated. Third, liability waivers and requests for student informed consent on university campuses during the pandemic show informed consent to be a tool for the exercise of biopolitics and, in particular, for making responsible subjects. Finally, civil libertarian opposition to migrant genetic testing on the grounds that migrants weren’t asked for consent demonstrates a tight coupling between consent, imaginations of just state-subject relations, and what it means to be recognized as a person. Ultimately, this dissertation argues for a practice of attention that sees informed consent as an important site for the exercise of power and offers frameworks for analyzing it as such.