Full metadata
Title
Expanding a Pharmaceutical Price Competition Model to Include On-Patent Drugs and Generic Competition
Description
This paper develops a theoretical price competition model, based on the model established in Brekke et al. (2010), in order to analyze the effects of exogenous reference price regulations on pharmaceutical firms' pricing strategies and competitive decisions. Our model establishes demand schedules that represent consumer demand for generic, brand-name, and on-patent drugs under free competition and governmental regulation. Drug equilibrium prices are determined by having firms play a Bertrand game. Equilibrium prices under reference price regulation indicate that the reference price set by regulators affects the price decisions of firms. Our model concludes that a higher reference price will increase the price of both the on-patent pioneer drug as well as the brand-name drug, while the generic drug price equilibrium is not affected by the reference price.
Date Created
2015-05
Contributors
- Spurlin, Jordan (Co-author)
- Fiacco, Leah (Co-author)
- Datta, Manjira (Thesis director)
- Leiva Bertran, Fernando (Committee member)
- Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
- Department of Economics (Contributor)
- Department of Finance (Contributor)
- School of Politics and Global Studies (Contributor)
Topical Subject
Resource Type
Extent
38 pages
Language
eng
Copyright Statement
In Copyright
Primary Member of
Series
Academic Year 2014-2015
Handle
https://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.29451
Level of coding
minimal
Cataloging Standards
System Created
- 2017-10-30 02:50:57
System Modified
- 2021-08-11 04:09:57
- 3 years 3 months ago
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